Blame the Worker
The Rise of Behavioral-Based
Safety Programs
By James Frederick and Nancy Lessin
Over the last decade, workplaces throughout the world have experienced massive restructuring that has included downsizing, increased hours of work (e.g., 12 hour shifts, mandatory overtime), intensification of work (increased work load and/or job duties), increased pace of work ("push for production") and a host of changes in technologies, work processes and management techniques. These changes, aimed at making workplaces more competitive and productive, have been associated with significant adverse health and safety impacts - repetitive strain injuries, stress, workplace violence, fatalities and other work-related injuries and illnesses.
Instead of examining how core work processes are affecting health and safety, many employers are directing attention to workers themselves as the problem rather than work restructuring and hazardous job conditions.
Enter "behavior-based safety" - safety programs that, depending on the particular behavioral safety program, claim that 80 to 96 percent of job injuries and illnesses are caused by workers' own unsafe acts. Behavior-based safety programs focus attention on worker carelessness and conscious or unconscious unsafe behaviors, and place the onus for a safe workplace on workers themselves.
The Behavioral Safety Industry
The "unsafe worker" statistics espoused by behavior-based safety
consultants and repeated by employers purchasing or developing
behavioral safety programs were derived from the work of insurance
investigator H.W. Heinrich in the 1930s. Heinrich's research into
injury causation consisted of his review of supervisors' accident
reports, which critics pointed out naturally blame workers for
accidents and injuries. He arrived at the statistic that 88 percent of
workplace accidents and worker injuries were caused by workers' unsafe
acts, numbers echoed by today's behavioral safety programs.
A variety of consultants and companies market behavioral safety programs to employers throughout the United States and around the world. The leading companies include Dupont (the Dupont STOP program), Behavioral Science Technologies, Aubrey Daniels (SafeR+ program), E. Scott Geller's Safety Performance Solutions (Total Safety Culture program), Topf Organization (SAFOR program) and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty's Managing Vital Performance - LMVP program). These programs identify "critical worker behaviors," train "observers" (workers and/or supervisors who observe worker behaviors) and use some form of "critical behavior check-lists" to document when a worker has engaged in a safe behavior or committed an unsafe act.
Promotional materials for the Dupont STOP program say "STOP is people talking with people about safety. In a series of training programs, behavior is modified in favor of safety. The objective of the STOP program is to teach safety auditing skills, so supervisors and employees can observe workers who are performing normal work activities, reinforce safe work practices, and correct unsafe acts and conditions. STOP effectively communicates management's commitment to safety through the entire organization. From the top manager down, all employees are involved in the program. Everyone has a role to play in the safety effort when STOP is on the scene."
The rhetoric is similar from Aubrey Daniels International. "Our systems approach includes safety-related behaviors at all levels, ensuring that people from executives to frontline associates form a partnership of responsibility for creating and maintaining a safe workplace," the company proclaims. "ADI uses Applied Behavior Analysis methods in every part of the safety intervention. This dedication to behavioral principles is reflected in the four basic steps of ADI's SafeR+:
- Target the behaviors that actually cause accidents. Some unsafe behaviors are obvious, but many critical risk-taking behaviors are ingrained, automatic and subtle and must be identified.
- Complete observations and measurement in less than five minutes per day. A simple, but precise observation/measurement method allows for more data collection which facilitates fast improvement.
- Integrate safety feedback into meetings, discussions and regular interactions. Numbers don't change behavior, but sharing data in a positive and constructive performance context gives people the direction and opportunity to improve.
- Create a culture that recognizes and rewards safe behaviors. Frequent recognition/reward is the only way to establish and maintain safe behaviors."
"Culture" - counterposed to work organization - is a major focus of the behavioral safety crowd. "The key to safety and environmental excellence lies in creating a new culture," explains the Topf Organization. "Culture is defined as the ideas, customs, values, norms, attitudes, commitments, and behaviors of a group of people in a given period."
Sometimes, the programs are less friendly in practice than they sound in promotional brochures. Some behavior-based programs emphasize employers disciplining workers. The training materials from a Dupont-based behavioral safety program at a New England defense manufacturer states, "Discipline for Safety Infractions. Do Not Wait for Injury." Other programs, however, suggest that overt discipline associated with the program could be problematic.
But overt discipline or no, what unifies the behavioral safety programs is their focus on the workers, rather than working conditions.
full story:
http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2000/00november/corp1.html
lifechild, are you paid by the UP to say these things?
Unions are formed by workers
In response to Indian Valley Line, you say you have been through the TSC program but either your shop has a very skewed version of it (if so please contact Safety Performance Solutions so they can help fix it) or your world view is such that you are not able to see past your own rhetoric. Let’s start with the basic assumption that a goal of the Union is improvement in workplace safety. How do we define that? There are multiple answers to that question but one is through the reduction of workplace injuries. This does not imply that we dismiss other ways of measuring workplace safety. The Union does and should continue to work at improving these other measures as well. In the area of reducing workplace injuries can TSC help? Yes. For example, in one Union Pacific shop people were getting killed at an average rate of one person every 7 months and 65+ people per year were sustaining a reportable injury. 10 years later, with TSC in place, they have had 0 fatalities and have a reportable injury rate of about 13 people per year. That’s over 50 people per year that did not get injured and no one died (where as, if the average non TSC death rate had continued, 8 people would have died). During those 10 years, or the next 10, if you could have saved over 500 injuries and 8 deaths, is TSC a process worth doing? While TSC is not the complete answer it is certainly a significant piece of the puzzle. No reasonable person says it is the only piece. We have an obligation to our brothers and sisters to continue working toward workplace safety in all areas but we can not throw out TSC unless we can give them these or better results through some other method.
I find it interesting that you try to control my comments on TSC through false logic. These methods are usually employed when the counter argument is weak. For you to say I have no place commenting on TSC because (in your view) I don’t know the history of BBS is not a logical conclusion. Using that logic I could not talk about my car unless I understand the history of the automotive industry. Your assertion that because TSC is from the field of BBS it is therefore BBS is also false. This guilt by association theory is also used defend an otherwise weak position. Let’s stick to the facts and leave out the jibes (the truth hurts?) and other emotional arguments so we can have a real conversation on the merits of TSC.
The pyramid I know of in TSC refers to how attitudes affect behavior which leads to safe or at-risk acts. TSC is multifaceted, and just because a particular point is emphasized in one area that does not mean other points are not addressed. While attitudes and behaviors are the subject on one slide, the importance of creating a safe environment is also addressed. While TSC employee workshops give people an overview about the whole TSC process there is an emphasis on attitudes and behaviors, because that is what is within the control of most individuals. TSC for facilitators and peer trainers and TSC for managers also cover the whole process with a different emphasis for each group. For you to focus on one slide from the presentation and imply that is the whole process is disingenuous. For you to give quotes from BST & DuPont programs during a discussion of TSC is also misleading. When you say something is “…simply backwards and wrong for workers and unions.” makes me wonder what criteria you are using as TSC is reducing workplace injuries.
While it is true that there is a rule behind most at-risk behaviors, it is false logic to then project that therefore TSC is about rules. Rules are related to discipline. TSC does not allow any discipline to be associated with the TSC process; therefore TSC is not about rules. TSC is about giving praise for safe behavior and encouraging change from an at-risk situation to a safe one. When you approach TSC with an attitude that says the TSC process is about rules or a judgment, then the TSC process will not work and there will be no change to your culture. When you approach it with concern and a desire for everyone to return back to what they value, co-workers are less defensive and more open to the change effort, communications are more open and productive, and the workforce is a team striving toward the common goal of a safe work environment. Because attitudes and behavior are areas within everyone’s immediate control, they are the primary focus of the employee workshop. However, that does not mean that employees do not report unsafe work conditions. In fact, until trust is built, almost all cards turned in relate to the environment. The TSC Implementation-team (I-Team) is made up of members of the critical five (peers, facilitators, upper management, lower management and the unions). The I-Team is trained to make corrections first in the area of environment, followed by changes to person and finally in the area of behavior. They are trained to do it in this way because environmental changes are the most effective. The I-Team is composed of the critical five because each group within the critical five has different resources, abilities and perspectives and these in turn lead to effective and durable solutions. Not only is rules violation tabulation not a central part of TSC, as you have clamed, but in fact, rules violation tabulation does not exist within the TSC process. If that is how your TSC is working please contact Safety Performance Solutions so they can help fix the process at your location.
I agree with you that we are safe workers. While some injuries are the result of uncontrollable events, most are the result of hazards in the workplace and to some extent how we choose to interact with the workplace. To say that workers have no control over their behavior is demeaning and disempowering to us all. An empowered person makes safety their own responsibility. The company safety processes, the Union and TSC are all tools that empowered workers can use to improve safety. If I see an area of my yard that is covered in water bottles, I can report it and avoid the area until it is corrected, I can clean it up so it is no longer a hazard to myself (or others) or I can ignore it and blame the injury to myself (or my brother/sister) on the company. Yes, the company is responsible for providing me with a safe workplace, but I can bet that the yard wasn’t built with those bottles there and it is up to me to report the problem so it can be corrected and to avoid the injury until it is corrected. This example has one brother setting up another brother for an injury and I am not implying that this is the norm. There are also examples where we (the workers) are not responsible for the hazard but in most cases (except uncontrollable events); we can identify an at-risk condition and choose to take the safe course or refuse to do the work until there is a safe alternative. This does not imply that the fault rests completely (or at all) with the worker. We are all good people and deserve world class training and risk-free workplaces and we need to use all the tools available to us to achieve that goal. Depending on the problem, the appropriate tool could be management, the Union , the FRA, etc. and I have to ask “How’s that been working out for you?” TSC does not replace any existing system but is a process that overlays all of them in order to reduce deaths and injuries.
Your quote of Mr. Geller from his speech to NACOSH on April 9, 1997 is provided for the stated purpose of “insight into how Mr. Geller thinks”. Here it is again so people don’t have to find it: “So putting up a guard might encourage them (workers) to get closer to the hole that’s being guarded, or encourage them to take more risks because of the extra perceived safety by that guard.” Having read some of Mr. Geller’s other works, let me give you insight on what that quote means. Our workplace is dynamic consisting of person, environment and behavior. We can not simply make a change to any one area and expect a perfect outcome. As humans we often make choices which are not always good for us. Let me give you an example. My grandfather was a sheriff in Michigan in the 50’s and 60’s. He quoted automotive industry statistics that showed that there was a certain mortality rate within the industry. Mortality rate is defined as X number of deaths per X number of drivers. The interesting part of the data was that each time there was a safety improvement made within the automotive industry there was a corresponding dip in the mortality rate for a number of years followed by a climb back to the previous rate. The researchers concluded that each time a safety improvement was made, people developed riskier driving habits due to the perception that the improvement would protect them. Relating this back to Geller’s quote, an improvement by itself is not enough. It must be part of a trilogy that includes environmental improvements, education (change to person) and training (change to behavior) in order to be effective. No reasonable person would take that to mean that we should not have installed shock absorbers or improved road conditions, nor should they take Geller’s quote to mean that he is advocating not making improvements to the workplace – he is simply stating that we can not depend on those improvements alone.
Please do not presume to finish my thoughts. You can have your own thoughts but do not attribute them to me. Heinrich was a person who did some research for an insurance company in the 30’s. As BBS was being developed there were many people who made contributions to the field. I am sure that Heinrich’s data was considered when TSC was developed but it is not reference and therefore I don’t think it is used in the TSC process. Likewise, Skinner, while a fascinating topic in its own right, is not referenced in the TSC process. I believe your attempt here is to quote these two people as authority in the area of BBS and then associate that with TSC process and that is simply not honest.
You say I state SPS is successful. Please go back and quote me. You can’t because it isn’t there. I hope the other quotes you have made have been chosen with better care. The only mention I make of SPS is that it was founded in 1995 and that the TSC process Geller developed was the culmination of many years of research. I have not looked into (nor do I care) how successful SPS is as a company – my only concern is with the TSC process. You also make some unsupported assumptions and then build on them as fact. Your whole line of reasoning is without basis and even if you could find a case where it is true that in and of itself does not make it true in other instances. What matters is why are your company, your union and your coworkers doing the TSC process. Just because someone else uses alcohol in a bad way does not make it a bad thing for everyone else either. Sorry, it’s your logic and your example I am borrowing from here. As covered in the original article and here, TSC does not advocate buying PPE (or the TSC process) to avoid fixing hazards in our workplace. Again, you can not start with unsupported assumptions and then build on them as fact. If you want to have credibility then, document where the TSC process has done any of these things. Otherwise it’s just your opinion and while you are entitled to your opinion, please do not present it as fact. Quoting the Hawthorne Effect, while also interesting in its own right, does not apply to TSC and its history within Union Pacific. The Hawthorne Effect diminishes over time typically down to 20% of the original impact at about the 8 week mark. TSC within Union Pacific has show a sustained improvement beginning after the third year and continuing now into its twelfth year. This pattern follows Geller’s research when it suggests that it takes between 3 and 10 years for a culture to change to a TSC culture. Your mention of the Hawthorne Effect here illustrates that you either do not understand what you are quoting or you are attempting to sway opinion on TSC with arguments that are not valid.
You state your argument that TSC is at odds with insurance companies in the premise that “…elimination of hazards as the best way to prevent injury.” and then ask the question “Who’s right here?”. TSC also promotes that elimination of hazards (correct the environment) is the best way to prevent an injury. Insurance companies and TSC are right here. You are wrong in your assumption that TSC does not attempt to correct the environment first. Again, from the employee workshop you might have missed this but it is in there. It is further emphasized in other TSC materials. This is good for most people as they only want to know the part they have within their control.
Please show where “It has been shown that the observation process in TSC degrades worker solidarity.” or “There is a lack of trust that is created inherent to the system.” have been documented. Remember we are talking about TSC and not some other BBS system. You set the stage so that comments you make are supposed to be different from what TSC says when in fact TSC does say that employees being observed will attempt to be safe (even then TSC says people sometimes don’t always do the safest course due to lack on knowledge or drift) and that training (education of person) is better than changes to behavior alone. Again, either you don’t know (or remember) the TSC process or you are intentionally trying to confuse the matter.
TSC observation books are developed locally by your I-Team. If yours doesn’t have a category you want, then volunteer to be a member of the I-Team and make it a better process. Our local observation book (and most that I have seen in use on the Union Pacific do have an observational category for Environment; all focus is not on the Employee and TSC does not say that it should be.
Your statement “The railroads do not fix items in a timely matter now!” begs the question “Why do I want to continue with a system that is having limited success?” You continue with “Why should we believe this program would do anything to change their track record?” and the answer to that is TSC’s proven track record. Please refer back to paragraph two for the details. Your next two statements further illustrate the need for TSC.
Your second to the last paragraph makes assumptions for a theoretical TSC implementer. Maybe they do it different where you are but our implementers work their normal jobs except for one meeting once per month so that would not apply where I work. Further Nancy Lessin does not pull the rug out from anyone in TSC with her above quoted article. She may be accurately describing other BBS programs but for her to state that TSC is a BBS and therefore suffers all the ills associated with other BBS programs is a false argument. There is no guilt by association to be had here and TSC stands on its own merits. If our theoretical person did not have the ability to reason for themselves and bought into all the false logic presented in your post then I suppose someone in that position might feel they were having the rug pulled out from under them – fortunately that is not the case. Your further contentions also do not apply.
You state that you have been through the TSC program but either your program is a perverted version of what TSC should be (contact SPS and let them know), you were not ready to listen with an open mind (you are too jaded to think change is possible) or your instructor had a really, really bad day. When you are ready, maybe you could ask to go through the class again. I’ll let you come to your own conclusion based on these two posts as to if I have done any research on BBS. I just don’t think that because something is true of BBS in general it necessarily has anything to do with TSC. People and processes both have the possibility for positive change. I went into TSC class with a clear list of concerns and can see where this process addresses them all. Truthfully, your arguments here do not even cover some of the more important ones and those were also corrected with this process. You talk about propaganda and I have to say there are far more propaganda techniques used within your own post then I have found within any of the TSC material I have seen.
Is the TSC process perfect? Maybe in a white paper form it is but like anything else when people start to get involved there is always the chance for unintended consequences. Even with those, the track record speaks for itself - as long as we (our peers), management and our Unions actively participate in the process we can keep the process on track.Once again, if you believe unions are formed from the collective need of its members then you must look at TSC and the lives it can save and protect. If you have a better alternative that has as good or better of a track record I would love to hear about it. I can live with your fear that the TSC process may have trouble (however unfounded I believe them to be) much easier than I can live with telling a spouse their loved one was injured or won’t be coming home again. This does not imply that TSC will take over safety – TSC requires union involvement and since it is run by people it needs constant monitoring to ward against complacency and attempts to turn the process into something else. This is one of the central roles that unions can perform within the TSC process. Unions are a part of achieving safety but they are not the whole answer and they should not be. This does not make the union less effective - it makes the union a vital part of the answer.
Important Points
I believe what you are saying here is very important to the whole issue.
You say “until trust is built”. There is no trust with this company. They prove, on a daily basis, that we cannot trust them. They prove it with constant attempts to modify contracts with new CMS policies. They prove it with intimidation and harassment when someone gets injured. They prove it with front-line managers who make up their own personal version of the rules so they have a “violation” to justify a failure. They prove it with officers who are willing to lie through their teeth. Don’t tell me about comparing apples and oranges. There is no way you could convince me this corporation will not find a way to bend the I-Teams or data to our detriment. They cannot or will not behave ethically in TSC while continuing their crap everywhere else.
You say the I-Team is trained to make “corrections first in the area of environment” & “almost all cards turned in relate to the environment”. Does that mean when you observe me at work and I relate a safety hazard to you that the I-Team writes it up and pursues it until the hazard is corrected? If not, what do they do about it? The cards I have seen (admittedly only from one terminal) have no place to note actual hazards, nor do they make any mention whatsoever about environment.The Truth Hurts.
If you do not know the history of BBS, you do not have a place commenting on TSC, they are one in the same. If you do not understand the past, you surely do not have a handle on what the future may bring.
You talk about Lessin's article being 8 years old which was posted on the RWU site. Being 8 years of age makes it no less valid than the day it was written. If you want to discuss something being outdated, the "pyramid" that TSC uses is based on original work dating back to a 1930's safety theory that BST & Dupont currently refer to as "cutting edge technology."Which is also the same pyramid that Geller and SPS use. Unlike the anchient Egyptians, this pyramid is filled with flaws and crumbles when you through facts at it and look at it with logic and reason. No matter the date, if the pyramid was introduced again tomorrow it is simply backwards and wrong for workers and unions.You state that TSC is not about rules. It is all about rules. On the railroad rules are what we work by, and the observation book is a way to record when an employee breaks those rules. I can't imagine a field observation taking place where the observer did not a note rule violations, that is what the book is there for. An unsafe act is a rule violation pure and simple and that is what will be noted. If a railroad worker is observed violating a GCOR rule, lets say an employee does not follow Dimming of Headlight 5.9.1 properly. How would that then be tabulated. In the TSC observation book it might be written, "The guy did not dim his headlight." Then, violations will be tabulated according to the rule that was violated. Rule violation tabulation will be central to TSC.
I will not dignify your words about at risk behaviors. We are safe workers. "Injury is the result of hazards that are present in the workplace, no exceptions!"
To provide some insight into how Mr. Geller thinks, here is a quote from him while speaking at the NACOSH (National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety & Health) in Washington, D.C. on April 9, 1997, “So putting up a guard might encourage them (workers) to get closer to the hole that’s being guarded, or encourage them to take more risks because of the extra perceived safety by that guard.”
You talk about Herbert William Heinrich and his work for Travelers Insurance. But you never finish you thought. Allow me to please pick up where you left off. Heinrich's work is the basis for the theory of which holds that as many as 95 percent of all workplace accidents are caused by unsafe acts. Sounds like blame the worker at its core to me! There is an ever deeper root to all this and it goes back to the work of B.F.Skinner. B.F. Skinner pioneered the American-based system of what university students often call “rat psychology”. Like Pavlov before him with his dogs, Skinner conducted experiments with rats which showed that their behavior could be modified by giving them certain stimuli and either rewarding them or punishing them. Skinner applied his laboratory results to the psychology of people.I am sure E. Scott Geller and SPS has been successful, it is a big companies dream to find a cheap way out of doing what is truly required, to fix the hazards that exist! You state that SPS is successful, but that does not mean it is a good thing for workers or unions. The mere fact that it is successful has no merit on its own. Alcohol and Tobacco is a huge success in this country as well, does that make it a good thing. Why fix a hazard when you can just buy more PPE! It is surely cheaper to hire SPS than to re-engineer the hazards that exist in our working environment as railroaders.
You might also look at the Hawthorne Effect. Simply stated, "The major finding of the study was that almost regardless of the experimental manipulation employed, the production of the workers seemed to improve. One reasonable conclusion is that the workers were pleased to receive attention from the researchers who expressed an interest in them.." This is a winner for UP as the Hawthrone study showed, when people are watched production goes up. Once again, real safety has no place in this plan. It is simply a means towards greater production.
For a more balanced look at BBS, you might also look at what some of the bigger insurance companies have to say about BBS. You will notice they all talk about elimination of hazards as the best way to prevent injury. These are people who pay out the money when injuries happen; their interest is in keeping that money in their pocket. Who's right here?
It has been shown that the observation process in TSC degrades worker solidarity. There is a lack of trust that is created inherent to the system. If employees do perform well it is because they are safe and paid attention during training or simply because they are being watched. Employees when they are being watched will of course be safe. The better way is to train them properly. The Philips Chemical Co. had BBS program in place, and had 5,000,000 man hours without a lost time injury, and then! An explosion with 23 deaths and 232 people injured! The BBS program focused so much on worker behavior, that training was not a priority and removal of workplace hazards as well as reporting of hazards led to a catastrophic incident.
The TSC observation book has no heading such as "Hazardous Condition Present." again; all focus is on the employee.
The railroads do not fix items in a timely matter now! Why should we believe this program would do anything to change their track record? The existing programs to point out hazards are a failure! The carrier drags there feet and rarely corrects hazardous conditions quickly even when employees document them in the prescribed manner.
There is another piece to all this. Imagine for a moment you have chosen (or you yourself have volunteered) to be a Total Safety Culture implementer. No more being on call, no more long nights walking some dog of a train in emergency in high temperatures or cold rainy nights, your own soft bed every night. No more locomotive cab, you now have a nice air-conditioned room and a 9-5 schedule, very seductive indeed. Now Nancy Lessin comes along and pulls the rug out from under you! It is becoming clear and the denial is fading away. Now it may all come to an end if TSC fails and you will go back to your seniority with the rest of the men and women working along with them. I contend that the seductiveness of becoming a TSC implementer is toxic to ones judgment. The allure of OS status and their own soft bed every night is far to tempting for some.
I have been through the TSC program. I am my own person and I choose logic, reason and the carrier’s track record to make the informed decision that TSC is a horrible road to go down. I wonder if Life Child did any research on BBS or simply took what he or she was handed as the gospel truth. Propaganda, well if you want to talk about the selective presentation of facts, Total Safety Culture is the biggest offender that I have come across in a long time.Make an informed decision
TSC was brought to the UP by the mechanical employees and their union in North Platte . Let's be clear here - this did not start as a company program, it was brought to the company but the mechanical union and its members. While the process is now being provided or offered to all employees of UP it is up to each individual to choose to participate in the process or not.
While the article we are commenting on is almost 8 years old and is based on information that is even older there are specific concerns listed and I can speak to them. Paragraph one talks about increased production pressure and that is certainly true.
Paragraph two talks about an either/or situation and while that may happen with some other behavior based safety programs it does not happen with TSC. TSC does not replace ANY existing safety program or system. This is true on the company and union sides. What TSC is asking employees to do is to start looking at those areas (our behaviors and attitudes) that neither the company nor unions have looked at up until this point. We are asked to look at safe and at-risk. There is no attempt to have this be about rules. There is also a provision that no discipline can result from the TSC process.
Paragraph three claims that behavior based safety programs say XX percent of injuries and illness are the result of unsafe acts. TSC does not place a percentage on this but does recognize that at-risk behaviors do contribute to accidents. TSC shares with us a safety triangle where the three sides are person, environment and behavior. This safety triangle is typically applied after an accident occurs and usually finds that there is not one area but a combination of areas that contribute to an accident. Accident investigators are trained to ask the question "Why?" five times to find the root cause instead of the symptom. TSC asks observers and observees to do this as well. TSC asks participants in the process to look at attitudes and behaviors (that covers person and behavior) AND also the environment. Once at-risk conditions are identified, employees AND the unions develop solutions to correct these to safe. I say employees because TSC requires that all employees including management take off their hats and work on solutions in a positive way with NO discipline.
Paragraph four references Heinrich and his findings from the 30's. The behavior based safety field became popular with industry in the 70's and Heinrich's data and many, many others from all walks of life made contributions to how this field developed. During this time E. Scott Geller was a professor of psychology at Virginia Tech and worked as a consultant to many companies as they developed their own programs. This was a time of experimentation and learning. E. Scott Gellar was a founding partner and co-owner of Safety Performance Solutions (SPS) who have been in business since 1995. SPS has benefited from over two decades of experience. TSC does not reference Heinrich's work.Paragraph five talks about some of the different companies selling behavior based safety programs. TSC does have an observation checklist (developed by employees, unions and management), does have observers, and praises safe behavior and works to find solutions to at-risk conditions.
The remainder of the story does not mention TSC. The final line states: But overt discipline or no, what unifies the behavioral safety programs is their focus on the workers, rather than working conditions. We have already covered that there is no discipline associated with TSC. It may be true for the rest of the behavior based safety programs but it is not true of TSC that our focus is on the workers. TSC has a focus on the safety triangle mentioned above – person, environment and behavior.
As the first poster said “Quit listening to the propaganda and be your own person. Research, go to the class, and make your own choice!” If you support the principles of RWU then I feel you have to make an informed decision and if the program you have in front of you is good then you have to support the union and it's members.
Absolutely: United We Stand, Divided We Fall!
I agree that our current efforts are not working, but behavior-based programs are not the answer. Instead our locals should develop their own safety program completely disconnected from the carriers. Our safety people should not be paid by the carriers; it has led to too many problems, ie union members using it for their own PERSONAL benefit.
In past safety programs that did not work, the union rep would present a safety concern/hazard to the carrier rep and would be told that since we are aware of the hazard, we are responsible for avoiding it. That is the same thing a behavior-based program does. IT DOES NOT GET THE HAZARD FIXED!
Alternative:
Each local (the different craft locals in a terminal could work together on this) forms their own safety committee.
Any phone calls between the safety committee and management/union leadership/FRA should be IMMEDIATELY documented with a follow-up letter outlining the conversation.
Once each level of management & our unions becomes aware that the safety committee is serious and will not be put off by excuses or phone calls, they will take actions to rectify problems. Then hazards will get fixed/properly addressed & our brothers and sisters will be safer.
If we want to address possible unsafe behaviors by our brothers & sisters lets do it in a manner developed and conducted in our own house. Don't do it as dictated and paid for by the carriers.
Behavioral-Based safety.
United we stand, Devided we fall!!!
Ok, so I have been thru the Total safety culture class and here is my take. After reading the information from many emails, and from this site, I have come to the conclusion. Does what we have now work? Has it ever worked? NO!! We need to find something that can. This class opened my eyes to the possibilitys of what we can accomplish. So far I have seen TSC bring workers closer together. With this I think it will strengthin the unions. We will have data to use to force the RR to be accountable for the enviroment! We will have the data to show the NTSB and the FRA exactly what is going on, and where the safety concerns really are. I have questioned and researched this for the past month or so, and I know it can work, but it takes all of us to push it!!! I am not afraid! I will not be afraid!!
So like I said at the first of this...... Does what we have now work? NO! This is costing us nothing. Quit listening to the propaganda and be your own person. research, go to the class, and make your own choice!